Revisions to the simpler approaches to operational risk: the need for enhanced disclosures and risk sensitive measures by Ojo, Marianne
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Revisions to the simpler approaches to
operational risk: the need for enhanced
disclosures and risk sensitive measures
Marianne Ojo
North West University
6. January 2015
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/61329/
MPRA Paper No. 61329, posted 16. January 2015 11:24 UTC
 
 
 
Revisions to the Simpler Approaches to Operational Risk: The Need for 
Enhanced Disclosures and Risk Sensitive Measures  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Business Indicator approach has been identified by the Basel Committee as the most suitable               
replacement for the Gross Income approach, since it addresses most of the Gross Income’s              
weaknesses, as well as possesses certain attributes which were highlighted to have been at the heart of                 
the recent Financial Crisis. It had been highlighted by the Committee that weaknesses of the simpler                
approaches to operational risk, were attributed and generated principally from the use of Gross Income               
(GI) as a proxy indicator for operational risk exposure. 
 
This paper highlights rationales for revisions to the present framework of approaches to operational risk               
and why adjustments to the simpler approaches have become necessary. Further, as well as              
accentuating on why issues relating to calibration and adequate focus on Pillar III of Basel II, namely,                 
market discipline, continue to dominate and feature as areas in need of greater attention, the paper also                 
seeks to demonstrate why Pillar III may be that area which requires greater focus - where matters                 
relating to goals of consistency, comparability and simplicity are involved. 
 
As well as consolidating on why gaps still persist in relation to disclosure requirements relating to                
operational risks, the paper will, more importantly, propose means of mitigating such gaps. 
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A Introduction 
 
According to the Basel Committee’s Consultative Document, weaknesses in current approaches to            2
operational risk, which constitute part of the rationales for revisions to the present framework, are to be                 
accomplished through:  3
 
- refining the operational risk proxy indicator by replacing Gross Income (GI) with a superior              
indicator;  
- and improving calibration of the regulatory coefficients based on the results of the quantitative              
analysis.  
 
Other reasons which have been played a contributory role in the Committee’s consideration to adopt a                
simple and comparable approach include results obtained from analyses whereby the following were             
highlighted:  4
 
- the original Basel II business lines did not differ significantly in terms of their operational risk                
profiles; 
-  the size of a bank was a dominant factor in operational risk exposure; 
-  and refinements to the proxy indicator could enhance risk sensitivity.  
 
 
The Need to Account Adequately for Off Balance Sheet Exposures 
 
As is the case with the Standardised Approach to Counterparty Credit Risk (SA-CCR), one of the                
aims of introducing the revisions to the present framework on operational risk, includes namely, the need                
1 Professor, Faculty of Commerce and Administration, North-West University  Email: marianneojo@hotmail.com 
2 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “Operational Risk: Revisions to the Simpler 
Approaches”, October 2014 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs291.htm at page 2 
3 ibid 
4 “It was therefore considered appropriate to develop only one approach based on a single indicator of operational 
risk exposure with size-based coefficients. A single non-model-based approach also addresses the Committee’s 
objectives of promoting simple and comparable approaches while still maintaining risk sensitivity.” see ibid 
to adequately account for exposures, and particularly, off- balance sheet exposures related to banking              
activities. 
 
The Standardised Approach for Measuring Counterparty Credit Risk exposures (SA-CCR) replaced           
the Current Exposure Method and the Standardised Method as these were criticised for not adequately               
capturing “the level of volatilities as observed over recent stress periods.” The conversion of off               5
balance sheet items into credit exposure equivalents were facilitated by the Basel Committee’s January              
2014 revised leverage ratio standard. 
 
It was also highlighted by the Committee that weaknesses of the simpler approaches were attributed               
and generated principally from the use of Gross Income (GI) as a proxy indicator for operational risk                 
exposure - “based on the assumption that banks’ operational risk exposure increases linearly in              
proportion to revenue.”  6
 
Having introduced reasons for revisions to the present framework of approaches to operational risk and               
why adjustments to the simpler approaches have become necessary, section B of the paper will               
provide a review to the background revolving round the introduction of the three pillar framework of                
Basel II. Whilst the volume of work, documentation and efforts relating to the first two pillars have been                  
considerable, and even though considerable efforts have recently been undertaken to improve work on              
Pillar III, this pillar (Pillar III), which is as equally important as the other two pillars, given its                  
complementary role, continues to experience certain gaps to an extent - particularly with respect to               7
operational risks. Section B aims to highlight some gaps which exist within the present disclosure               
framework as well as illustrate how the Committee has attempted to address these. Subsequent sections               
are aimed highlighting the importance of addressing these gaps - as well as means of redress. In order to                   
facilitate this goal, section C considers whether the goals of simplicity and comparability should              
constitute the focus in matters relating to measurements and standardised approaches. It also considers              
the feasibility of these goals with the goal of achieving enhanced risk-sensitivity. The importance of               
disclosures, as a facilitator of capital adequacy objectives will then be considered - as well as means of                  
addressing other identified gaps relating to operational risk disclosures - by way of illustration to recent                
efforts which have been undertaken by the Basel Committee in respect of leverage ratios.  
 
 
5 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “The Standardised Approach for Measuring Counterparty Credit              
Risk Exposures (March 2014) at page 1 Available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs279.htm  
6 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “Operational Risk: Revisions to the Simpler 
Approaches”, October 2014 at page 1 
7 “The Basel Committee (BIS 2003) accorded a lot of attention (132 pages) to the refinements of the risk weights as 
regards the first pillar, but was considered to be much less precise about the other pillars (16 pages on Pillar 2 and 15 
pages on Pillar 3).” See JC Rochet, “Re balancing the Three Pillars of Basel II” 
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/epr/04v10n2/0409roch.pdf 
 
 
B Review and Background to Literature on Operational Risks 
 
 
The first consultative paper on a new capital adequacy framework, which was issued by the Basel                
Committee on Banking Supervision, introduced the „three pillar“ model which encompasses the            
minimum capital requirements, supervisory review and market discipline - „as a lever to strengthen              
disclosure and encourage safe and sound banking practices.“  8
 
Basel II is premised on a three level approach which permits banks to select from three models, namely:                  
the basic standardized model, the IRB foundation approach and the advanced ratings approach. In              
establishing an Internal Ratings Based approach, the Committee's intention was directed at „fine tuning              
capital requirements with a greater degree of accuracy to the level of a bank's exposure to credit risks.“   9
 
Under Pillar One minimum capital requirements, operational risk is to be corroborated by capital.              
Measurement approaches for operational risk can be found in the Capital Requirements Directive             
(CRD) and there are three broad approaches to the capital assessment of operational risk which are as 
follows: 
 
− Basic Indicator Approaches 
− Standardized Approaches 
− Internal Measurement Approach 
 
 
Three approaches are stipulated by the Basel framework for the measurement of the capital charge for 
operational risk and these are as follows:  10
 
- The Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) which is the simplest and whereby the capital charge is               
calculated as a percentage (alpha) of Gross Income (GI), a proxy for operational risk exposure.               
Being the most basic approach, its adoption does not require prior supervisory approval.  
 
8 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Consultative Paper on a New Capital Adequacy Framework' 3rd June 
1999 http://www.bis.org/press/p990603.htm> 
9 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'The Internal Ratings Based Approach' Supporting Document to the New 
Basel Capital Accord 2001 at pages 1 and 3 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca05.pdf 
 
10 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “Operational Risk: Revisions to the Simpler 
Approaches”, October 2014 at page 5 
- The advanced measurement approaches (AMA), the most advanced, which allows banks to            
use internal models to calculate their capital requirements. Adoption of the AMA requires prior              
supervisory approval and involves implementation of a rigorous risk management framework. 
 
- The Standardised Approach (TSA), which is positioned as an intermediate approach between            
the BIA and the AMA, which requires banks to divide their total GI into eight business lines and                  
to calculate capital requirements as a sum of the products of the GI attributed to each business                 
line and the specific regulatory coefficients (betas) assigned to each line.  
 
 
Unlike other classes of risks, which also incorporate quantitative disclosures requirements, qualitative            
disclosure requirements constitute the focus of attention in relation to operational risks. According to              
paragraph 824 of the revised Basel II framework general qualitative disclosure requirements which             11
should be observed are as follows: 
 
- For each separate risk area (e.g. credit, market, operational, banking book interest rate risk,              
equity) banks must describe their risk management objectives and policies, including: 
- strategies and processes; 
- the structure and organisation of the relevant risk management function; 
- the scope and nature of risk reporting and/or measurement systems; 
- policies for hedging and/or mitigating risk and strategies and processes for monitoring the             
continuing effectiveness of hedges/mitigants.  
 
The following important observations, based on results of studies and results of empirical investigations,              
were also made in relation to the adequacy, implementation of policies, and verification of risk               
disclosure practices:  12
 
 
- that regarding the adequacy of operational risk disclosures for stakeholders, most noted that             
there is a dedicated section for operational risk in external reports, which are regularly updated.               
However, since most banks don’t disclose sensitive information relating to control gaps or             
issues, these disclosures tend to be primarily high-level statements 
 
11 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and               
Capital Standards: A Revised Framework - Comprehensive Version June 2006 at page 232             
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128c.pdf 
 
12 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Review of the Principles for the Sound Management of Operational                 
Risk 6 October 2014 at page 33 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs292.pdf 
- that in relation to the disclosure policies that address operational risk disclosures, most banks              
reported that these are not fully implemented and that the general inference was that most               
participating banks have in place, or will shortly have in place, a disclosure policy.  
 
- In addition, some banks have yet to implement a process to review and verify operational risk                
disclosure practices  
 
The penultimate section of this paper will seek to illustrate, as well as consolidate on why gaps still                  
persist in relation to disclosure requirements relating to operational risks. More importantly, it will seek               
to address these by proposing means of mitigating such gaps. 
 
 
 
B II Replacing the the Gross Income Indicator with the Business Indicator 
 
 
The Business Indicator (BI) was identified by the Basel Committee as the most suitable replacement for                
GI, since it addresses most of the GI’s weaknesses, as well as possesses the following attributes which                 
were also highlighted to have been at the heart of the recent Financial Crisis:  13
 
- it includes items sensitive to operational risk that are omitted or netted from the GI definition; 
- uses the absolute values of its components, thereby avoiding counterintuitive results based on             
negative contributions of components to capital charges from net losses under the existing             
framework; 
- reduces the relative weight or contribution of components of the financial statement that are              
associated with activities traditionally less exposed to operational risk, and increases that of the              
components associated with activities more closely associated with operational risk  
 
Furthermore, the BI’s power, according to the Committee, as compared with GI and other potential               
indicators, lies in “its superior ability to capture a bank’s exposure to the operational risk inherent in a                  
bank’s mix of business activities.” 
 
As is the case with the Standardised Approach to Counterparty Credit Risk, main issues revolve around                
the most efficient mode of capturing off balance sheet exposures, as well as the determination of the                 
frequency of calculations - such that inaccurate measures or estimates or the inability to adequately               
account for such exposures, does not result in the severe under capitalisation of banks. Hence, the                
13 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “Operational Risk: Revisions to the Simpler 
Approaches”, October 2014 at page 1 “The BI comprises the three macro-components of a bank’s income statement: 
the “interest component”, the “services component”, and the “financial component”. 
focus, it would seem, should concern accuracy of measures. Even though considerable efforts have              
been undertaken in the choice of determining the Business Indicator as replacement for the Gross               
Income, it appears that a lot of focus has also been given towards the goal of attaining simplicity,                  
comparability and consistency. These could be particularly difficult given the institution specific attributes             
inherent in the nature of operational risks. 
 
As indicated by the Committee, “ in order for an indicator to be an effective proxy of operational risk                   
for regulatory purposes, it is crucial that specific banking characteristics are captured by its              
components……..”  14
 
 
 
C Achieving Simplicity and Comparability of Outcomes Within the Framework 
 
 
Principles taken into consideration in formulating the revised standardised approach, as stated by the              
Committee, are as follows:  15
 
 
- There should be only one simple approach given the need to ensure simplicity and comparability of                
outcomes in the framework; 
- The approach should address the known weaknesses of the existing simpler approaches while             
retaining the fundamental attributes of the current framework; 
- It should be simple enough to understand, not unduly burdensome to implement, should not have               
too many parameters for calculation by banks and it should not rely on banks’ internal models; 
- It should exhibit enhanced risk sensitivity; 
- It should be calibrated according to the operational risk profile of a large number of banks of                 
different size and business models; and 
- It should be suitable for implementation across a wide range of jurisdictions and banks. 
 
Whilst the goals of simplicity and comparability resonate strongly from the first and third of the                
above-mentioned principles, the need for improved risk sensitivity and specificity, is also highlighted. 
 
Improved risk sensitivity would appear to denote improved accuracy - provided such risk sensitivity is               
not unwarranted or excessive. Trade-offs will definitely be required since simplicity and comparability             
will also demand that less complex approaches (complex approaches which may enhance risk sensitivity              
and specificity) should be adopted. 
 
14 see ibid at page 30 
15 see ibid at page 7 
In addition, the growing importance of compliance with Basel rules and principles is also evident, not                
only as a result of recent surveys and findings thereof, but also as evidenced by the Binding Technical                  16
Standards (BTS) which are being introduced and generated by the European Banking Authority, as its               
plays a crucial role in the implementation of Basel III. 
 
According to the Basel Committee, the Basel framework recognises that capital is not a substitute for                
effective controls and risk management processes. “Rather, strong and effective risk management and             
internal control processes help reduce the capital that a bank needs to hold against its operational risks.                 
An emphasis on sound management of operational risk to ensure financial soundness of banks is               
consistent with the uncertainties in the current capital measurement methodologies for operational risk,             
which are improved but still evolving toward maturation….”  17
 
As well as an effective compliance culture, an adequate and appropriate focus on the third pillar of                 
Basel II is vital in ensuring that the objectives of other pillars are achieved. A lot of observations and                   
comments have been made over the years in relation to the seemingly and relatively low attention                
accorded to the third pillar - in comparison to Pillars I and II. 
 
Hence the Committee’s observations in the Consultative Document that “banks should regularly report             
operational risk exposures, including material operational losses, to business unit management, senior            
management, and to the board of directors and that the reporting should be actionable and support                
decision making”, should be very welcomed.  18
 
 
 
D The Importance of Disclosures: Achieving Capital Adequacy Objectives 
 
The complementary function of Pillar III (market discipline) to the other two pillars (minimum capital               
requirements and supervisory review) is highlighted in the Basel Committee’s comprehensive version of             
the revised framework for Basel II. Furthermore, its Review of the Principles for the Sound               19
16 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,  Review of the Principles for the Sound Management of Operational Risk 
6 October 2014  
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs292.pdf 
17 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “Operational Risk: Revisions to the Simpler 
Approaches”, October 2014 at page 16 
18 See ibid at page 46 
19 “The Committee aims to encourage market discipline by developing a set of disclosure requirements which will                 
allow market participants to assess key pieces of information on the scope of application, capital, risk exposures, risk                  
assessment processes, and hence the capital adequacy of the institution.”  
See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards: A Revised Framework - Comprehensive Version June 2006 at page 226 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128c.pdf 
Management of Operational Risk, highlights the importance of the role of disclosure. Principle 11              20
“Role of Disclosure” states that a bank’s public disclosures should allow stakeholders to assess its               
approach to operational risk management. 
 
 
 
In its Consultative Document on the Review of the Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements, it was observed                
that:  21
- there is no provision in the current Pillar 3 regime for periodic assessment of the relevance of                 
existing disclosure requirements or for the introduction of new regulatory disclosure           
requirements to reflect emerging systemic risks. The Committee will periodically consider the            
validity of the disclosure requirements proposed in the new Pillar 3 regime and the need for                
additional disclosures to reflect changes to the regulatory framework or to meet emerging             
systemic risks that are identified to be of global significance. 
 
Lack of consistency in the following areas, were also brought to light by the Review:   22
- the interpretation of key terms through differing implementation of disclosure requirements by            
members’ jurisdictions; 
- the demarcation of information disclosed in each risk category (eg counterparty credit risk is              
often included in the credit risk disclosure but not always);  
- and the basis of the information disclosed (eg financial information disclosed rather than             
regulatory risk exposures or internal value-at-risk (VaR) rather than regulatory VaR): 
- Further, the Review noted that it is currently difficult for users to understand differences between               
line items in banks’ financial statements and the regulatory exposure data in their Pillar 3 reports.  
 
 
 
As well as the recognition of the need for a Pillar 3 disclosure framework which does not conflict with                   
requirements under accounting standards, which are broader in scope, under given circumstances,            
banks are required to explain material differences between the accounting or other disclosure, as well as                
the supervisory basis of disclosure.  23
20 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Review of the Principles for the Sound Management of Operational                 
Risk 6 October 2014 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs292.pdf 
21 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “Review of the Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements” 
at page 5 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs286.pdf 
  
22 see ibid 
23 “Such explanation does not have to take the form of a line by line reconciliation.” 
 
In this respect, reference will be made to recent public disclosure requirements relating to Basel III                
leverage ratios. 
 
The importance of attaining the goals of consistency and objectivity, as a means of facilitating enhanced                
disclosures is clearly indicated in paragraph 42 of the Basel Committee’s January 2014 publication on               
disclosure requirements.  24
 
The public disclosure requirements include:  25
 
- a summary comparison table that provides a comparison of banks’ total accounting assets             
amounts and leverage ratio exposures; 
- a common disclosure template, which as previously discussed, provides a breakdown of the             
main leverage ratio regulatory elements; 
- a reconciliation requirement that details the source(s) of material differences between banks’            
total balance sheet assets in their financial statements and on- balance sheet exposures in the               
common disclosure template;  
- and other disclosures. 
 
Such disclosure requirements as those reflected above whose purposes clearly serve to facilitate             
consistency and comparability through the incorporation of a common template, comparison table and             
reconciliation requirements should also serve to promote such goals in cases applicable to operational              
risks - particularly the gaps highlighted under section B - relating to lack of implementation of disclosure                 
policies and operational risk disclosure practices. 
 
Disclosure requirements’ role and aim in facilitating comparability across jurisdictions, has become even             
more important as a result of the consequential developments following the introduction of the Basel               
leverage ratio, namely the introduction of supplementary leverage ratios in different jurisdictions and             
concerns relating to the way in which accounting policies within these jurisdictions will impact their               
implementation. The introduction of supplementary leverage ratios in certain jurisdictions such as the UK              
and the U.S, is attributed not only to concerns which have been expressed in relation to the Basel                  
leverage ratio not being as well calibrated to accommodate such buffers as those which exist within the                 
risk based capital adequacy framework, but also to the appropriateness of measures such as the               
Standardised Approach to Counterparty Credit Risk (SA-CCR) in adequately accounting for           
See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards: A Revised Framework - Comprehensive Version June 2006 at page 227 
24 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Basel III Leverage Framework and Disclosure Requirements”,              
January 2014, page 9 Bank for International Settlements Publications http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs270.pdf 
 
25 ibid 
off-balance sheet exposures through the use of credit conversion factors. For these, as well as other                
reasons related to the need to avoid undercapitalisation in banks, and potential systemic consequences              
to the financial system, accuracy and risk sensitivity in implementing standardised approaches and             
measures appears to be a more profound need than the goals of simplicity where such measures and                 
approaches are concerned.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E Conclusion 
 
From the three pillars, the third pillar, is perhaps that area which requires the greatest level of simplicity                  
and comparability in terms of the need to facilitate comparisons of disclosures across jurisdictions. Not               
only because of the level of expertise (particularly low level of expertise of users of financial statements)                 
or role of those involved, but also the need to ensure that potential for abuse of such information, as well                    
as information asymmetries are mitigated - and that right signals are conveyed to the market. Information                
which may or may not have huge systemic consequences. The degree to which such information is                
accurate would definitely depend on Pillars I and II. It could be argued that each pillar should be                  
accorded the same degree of accuracy or simplicity. However, it would also appear that those               
processes involving measurements require greater degree of accuracy. 
 
From this perspective, the summary comparison table, common disclosure template, and reconciliation            
requirement for public disclosures (Basel III leverage ratios) and the considerable efforts which have              
been dedicated towards facilitating meaningful comparisons across jurisdictions with different accounting           
frameworks, represent a huge step towards achieving the goals of disclosure, namely: assisting market              
participants to “assess key pieces of information on the scope of application, capital, risk exposures,               
risk assessment processes, and hence the capital adequacy of the institution.”  
 
Where all efforts have been undertaken to facilitate accuracy, then some stages and processes are               
better left to address the need for consistency and comparability - particularly in unavoidable              
circumstances which are attributed to different and inflexible accounting policies and frameworks.            
Another lesson derived from the implementation of the Basel III leverage ratio is that the goal of                 
simplicity and consistency, associated with the aims and objectives of the leverage ratio has not really                
been realised and that its implementation has only prompted more complex scenarios and applications in               
the form of the introduction of jurisdictional supplementary leverage ratios - as well as enhanced               
supplementary leverage ratios. Such developments whilst being attributed to calibration issues between            
the capital adequacy and leverage ratio frameworks, have also taken place owing to fears of inaccurate                
measures - particularly the use of credit conversion factors within the Standardised Approach             
(SA-CCR) framework to account for off balance sheet exposures, and the need to avoid              
undercapitalisation with particularly, globally systemically important banking institutions. 
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